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NOTES AND COMMENTS
question is much broader than the cited application in the Sorrells
case."
63
It seems desirable that the North Carolina court distinguish between
the doctrine of entrapment as defined in the federal courts, and the de-
fense of consent of the victim in prosecutions involving offenses to which
such consent is a defense. While the two defenses tend naturally to
overlap in factual settings, it should be remembered that they are en-
tirely distinct defenses: the one, admiting commission of the offense but
pleading entrapment by officers of the government, a plea whose founda-
tion is public policy; and the other, a plea of not guilty by virtue of the
fact that the conduct of the victim robbed the act of an essential element
of criminality.
JACK T. HAMILTON.
Eminent Domain-Just Compensation-Rydro-Electric Dam Sites
In the past when the government has taken private property for pub-
lic purposes or allowed one of its agencies to do so, the "just compensa-
tion" guaranteed to the private owner by the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution1 has meant that the owner would receive the
full and perfect equivalent of the property in money or money's worth.2
Theoretically, the owner is to be put in as good a position pecuniarily
as he would have been had his property not been taken.3 In arriving at
this "equivalent" the courts have sought to determine the full and perfect
market value of the property at the time it was taken.4 This has involved
a consideration of the best and most profitable use to which the property
was adaptable and likely to be used in the reasonably near future,5 not
03 Ibid.
' U. S. CoxisT. amend. V, "... nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation."
2 Olsen v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 255 (1946) ; Jacobs v. United States,
290 U. S. 13, 17 (1933) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S.
299, 304 (1923) ; North Carolina v. Sunrest Lumber Co., 199 N. C. 199, 154 S. E. 2d
123 (1930).
' Olson v. United States, supra note 2; United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369,
373 (1924) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, sipra note 2.
'United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 275 (1943) ; United
States v. Miller, supra note 3, at 374; Carolina & Yadkin R. R. v. Armfield, 167
N. C. 464, 83 S. E. 809 (1914) ; Creighton v. Water Commissioner, 143 N. C. 171,
55 S. E. 511 (1906).
'United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, supra note 4, at 276; McCandless
v. United States, 298 U. S. 347 (1935) ; Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246,
255 (1933) ; Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U. S. 106 (1924) ; United
States v. Seufert Bros. Co., 78 Fed. 520 (C. C. D. Ore. 1897) ; Young v. Harrison,
17 Ga. 30 (1855) ; Alloway v. Nashville, 78 Tenn. 510 (1890) ; Sargent v. Merri-
mac, 196 Mass. 171 (1907) ; Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District v. Fitzpatrick,
201 Minn. 442, 277 N. W. 394 (1937) ; Raymond v. The King, 16 Can. Exch. 1, 29
D. L. R. 574 (1916), aff'd, 59 Can. S. C. 682, 49 D. L. R. 689 (1918) ; ln re Gough
& The Asportia, Silloth, & District Water Board, L. R. 1904, 1 K. B. 417; Note,
34 IowA L. REv. 695 (1949) ; 18 Amt. JuR., Eminent Domain, §§ 244, 245 (1938).
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just at the time of the taking.6 This is, however, just an element and not
the measure of damages and is to be considered as it would affect value
in a transaction between private parties,7 i.e., as in a transaction between
a well informed and willing seller and an equally well informed and
willing buyer.8 The fact that the property could be so used only in coml
bination with other property does not exclude this element from con-
sideration provided there be a reasonable possibility of such combination.9
In the case of hydro-electric sites, the latter factor has been applied some-
what more strictly than in other cases, and it has been necessary that
there be a reasonable possibility of combination without the use of emi-
nent domain. 10
However, since the United States Supreme Court decided Grand
River Dam Authority v. Grand Hydro Corp.," there has been some
doubt as to whether this general rule would apply in eminent domain
proceedings instituted by the federal government under act of Congress
or by an agency or licensee of the federal government under the Federal
Power Act. 12  There, Grand Hydro, a private corporation, had been
granted a franchise by the State of Oklahoma for the development of
water power on the Grand River and had acquired considerable property
which it planned to incorporate into the project. Subsequently the state
legislature created the Grand River Dam Authority, a governmental
corporate agency having the power of eminent domain, to develop and
sell water power and electric energy in the Grand River Basin. The
Authority then received a license from the Federal Power Commission
' Olson v. United States, supra note 5, at 258; San Diego Land & Town Co. v.
Neal, 78 Cal. 63, 20 Pac. 372 (1898); see generally, JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN-
VALUATION AND PROCEDURE, § 78 (1953).
" Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 257 (1933) ; New York v. Sage, 239
U. S. 57 (1915) ; Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189 (1910) ;
Moulton v. Newburyport Water Co., 137 Mass. 163 (1884) ; In Boston Chamber
of Commerce v. Boston, supra, at 195, Mr. Justice Holmes said, ". . . [A]nd the
question is, what has the owner lost? Not, What has the taker gained?"
8 Olson v. United States, supra note 7, at 257; United States v. Miller, 317 U. S.
369, 374 (1942); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N. C. 200, 205, 17
S. E. 2d 10, 13 (1941) ; 18 Am. JUR., Eminent Domain, § 242 (1938).
'United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 275 (1943);
McCandless v. United States, 298 U. S. 342, 348 (1935) ; Olson v. United States,
292 U. S. 246, 256 (1935) ; New York v. Sage, 239 U. S. 57, 61 (1915) ; Boston
Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189, 195 (1909).
" United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, sipra note 11, at 276; See also,
Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246 (1933) ; North Kansas Development Co. v.
Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 147 F. 2d 161 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 867(1945) ; Boetger v. United States, 143 F. 2d 391 (1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323
U. S. 772 (1944) ; United States v. Boston C. C. & N. Y. Canal Co., 271 Fed. 877(1st Cir. 1921) ; ANoT., 124 A. L. R. 955 (1937) ; Notes, 35 HARV. L. REv. 76(1921) ; 44 YALE L. J. 1095 (1935).
1335 U. S. 359 (1948), affirming, 200 Okl. 157, 201 P. 2d 225 (1947).
1249 STAT. 838, 16 U. S. C. § 791 (1935). For history see Wheeler, The Federal
Power Commission As An Agency of Congress, 14 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1945) ;
Lea, The Federal Power Commission as an Agency of Congress, 14 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 5 (1945) ; Pinchot, The Struggle for Effective Federal Water Power Legis-
lation, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 9 (1945).
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granting to it the sole right to develop water power on the Grand River.
Thereafter, Grand Hydro assigned its property to the Authority with a
stipulation that the value should be determined as though the assignment
had not been made. The parties were unable to agree on the value of
the property and the Authority filed action to condemn the property.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, with two dissents, held that even
though the Authority had been licensed by the Federal Power Commis-
sion and had been granted an exclusive right to build the project by the
State of Oklahoma, it could not take private property without just com-
pensation, and the court felt that just compensation included the special
adaptability of the property for development as a hydro-electric dam
site.13  On appeal the United States Supreme Court in a five to four
decision affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma and
held that the Federal Power Act had not so far affected the value of
property as a prospective site for hydro-electric development as to ex-
clude the state law of damages in a state proceeding. The court expressly
pointed out, however, that (1) no reference was made in the petition for
condemnation to possible rights under the Federal Power Act and (2)
the Federal Power Act merely attached certain conditions tb the use of
the land as a power site.14 Finally, the court stated that it would "...
express no opinion upon what would be the appropriate measure of value
in a condemnation action brought by the United States or by one of its
licensees in reliance upon rights derived under the Federal Power Act."' 5
Writers commenting on Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand
Hydro Corp.16 and two decisions from the ninth circuit, Continental
Land Co. v. United States17 and Washington Water Power Co. v. United
States,'8 have indicated that the special adaptability of property for
hydro-electric dam site construction would not and should not be con-
sidered as an element of "just compensation" where the taking happened
to be by the federal government or its licensee. In each of the above men-
tioned cases the federal government took private property with the in-
tention of using it for hydro-electric development, and compensation on
the basis of its special adaptability was denied. In neither of these cases,
however, was there a reasonable possibility that private power interests
would have been able to combine the necessary land without using the
power of eminent domain,' 9 and the circuit court employed this factor
23200 Okl. 157, 201 P. 2d 225 (1947).
Note, 27 N. C. L. Rv. 359 (1949).
15335 U. S. at 373.
10Notes, 62 HARV. L. REv. 694 (1949) ; 34 IowA L. Rav. 695 (1949) ; 27 N. C.
L. REv. 359 (1949).1788 F. 2d 104 (9th Cir. 1937).
18135 F. 2d 541 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 747 (1943).
In Washington Water Power Co. v. United States, 88 F. 2d 104 (9th Cir.
1937), any private power project would have flooded lands belonging to the federal
government.
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to exclude the element of special adaptability from consideration. But,
in addition, the court stated in each of these cases that a private owner
has no compensable interest in the prospective use of water power where
the federal government has exercised its superior right.
The issue was presented to the United States Supreme Court re-
cently in United States v. Twin City Power Company.2 0 The Twin
City Power Companies 21 between 1901 and 1911 had acquired substan-
tially all the property along the Savannah River necessary for the con-
struction of a hydro-electric project with a dam at Price's Island which
was very suitable for that purpose.22 Congress, upon the recommenda-
tion of the Secretary of War, granted its approval in six acts passed
between 1901 and 1919. In 1926 the Federal Power Commission granted
Twin City Power Co. a preliminary permit for the development. From
1928 until 1932 the Savannah Electric Co. held a federal license to build
at Clark's Island and to incorporate the Twin City property into the
larger project. During this period other private companies showed in-
terest in the property. Finally Congress, in the Flood Contral Act of
1944,23 authorized the construction of the project by the federal govern-
ment using public funds, and the Savannah Electric Co. was denied a
license by the Federal Power Commission.2
4
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for a majority of five,25 elaborated upon
his dissenting opinion in Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand Hydro
Co. and determined that the adaptability of this property for such de-
velopment would not be allowed as an element in determining compen-
sation.2 6 In doing so he overturned two circuit court decisions which
20 350 U. S. 222 (1956).
21 Twin City Power Co., a South Carolina corporation, and Twin City Power
Co. of Georgia, a wholly owned subsidiary of the former.
2 "Twin City's 4,700 acres would include all except about 170 acres of land
and rights necessary for the location of a dam, plant, and reservoir basin with a
60-foot head of water at Price's Island. A 60-foot head at that point with a 5-foot
surcharge would require about 400 additional acres instead of 170, a 70-foot head
with a 5-foot surcharge, 1,250 acres, and an 80-foot head with a 5-foot surcharge,
2,800 acres. The Twin City land was not only available but essential for such
development in the vicinity of Price's Island." 350 U. S. 222, 231 n. 2.
3 Flood Control Act of 1944, c. 665, § 10, 58 STAT. 887, 894 (approving the
Savannah River Basin Project for flood control and other purposes as recommended
by the Chief of Engineers in H. R. Doc. No. 657, 78th Cong., and the construction
of the Clark Hill Reservoir on the Savannah River at an estimated cost of
$35,300,000.00).
24 See Savannah River Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 164 F. 2d 408
(4th Cir. 1947), affirming the refusal of the license on the ground that Congress
had declared its intent to exclude private development.
2 Mr. Justice Burton, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Minton, and Harlan,
dissented.
20335 U. S. 359, 375 (1948). By passing the Federal Power Act, Congress
asserted the exclusive dominion and control of the public over this water power and
intended to defeat the claims of private parties. It was felt that the majority opinion




had determined that Twin City Power Co. should be allowed to recover
this element of value.
2 T
Seemingly, the line of reasoning adopted by the majority in the prin-
cipal case is that the federal government, under the commerce power
granted Congress in the Constitution,2 has a dominant interest" in the
flow of a navigable stream which may, in the discretion of Congress, be
exerted to the exclusion of any conflicting or competing riparian in-
terests, state or private.3 0  By passing the Flood Control Act of 1944,31
reasoned the court, Congress expressly exercised this dominant power
and thereby deprived riparian owners of any interest in the power
potential of the stream. This claim of the owners, further states the
court, is a claim for a special value inherent in their land due to its
proximity to a navigable stream and compensation is, in effect, sought
for an interest in the flow of the stream which they could not own and
from which they had been expressly excluded by Congress.
In this opinion Mr. Justice Douglas cites Chandler-Dunbar Co. v.
United States32 as the controlling case and quotes extensively from a
portion of that decision relating to a claim for compensation for certain
dams, dykes, and forbrays which had been used in the claimant's lock-
canal system and incidentally to produce electricity, and which the Sec-
retary of War had determined to constitute hindrances to the develop-
ment of the navigation potential of the Niagara River by the federal
government. Also, there is a reference to a portion of the decision relat-
ing to certain riparian property which had possible value as factory sites
with the factories to be supplied with electricity from the excess water
power.
However, the majority in the principal case ignored another portion
of Chandler-Dunbar Co. v. United States which was relied upon by the
two circuit courts and by the dissenters, and which is perhaps more
27 United States v. Twin City Power Co., 215 F. 2d 592 (14th Cir. 1954) and
United States v. Twin City Power Co. of Georgia, 221 F. 2d 299 (5th Cir. 1955).
_' U. S. CoNsT., art. I, § 8, "The Congress shall have the power . . . (3) To
regulate commerce. . . ."; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311
U. S. 377 (1940), (The power of the United States over its waters which are
capable of interstate commerce arises from the Commerce Clause of the Constitu-
tion. The power to regulate commerce necessarily includes the power to regulate
navigation. United States v. Applachian Electric Power Co., supra, at 405.)
2" Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Co., 347 U. S. 239,
249 (1954) ; United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U. S. 386, 391 (1945),(dominant servitude) ; United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 239 U. S. 725, 736
(1950), (superior navigation easement): Accord, United States v. Chicago, Mil-
waukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. R. Co., 312 U. S. 592 (1941); United States v.
Cress, 343 U. S. 316 (1916) ; United States v. Willow River Power Co., 329 U. S.
499 (1913); and St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Commis-
sion, 168 U. S. 349 (1897).
"0 See note 28 supra. 21 See note 23 srupra.
22229 U. S. 53 (1913). "Ownership in a private stream wholly upon the lands
of an individual is conceivable; but that the running water in a great navigable
stream is capable of ownership is inconceivable." Id. at 69.
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directly analogous. Chandler-Dunbar Co. also owned certain fast land
which it had set aside for further canal and lock development and which
was the only property in the vicinity suitable for that purpose. The
court affirmed the decision of the lower court allowing compensation
based upon this element of special adaptability, basing the decision upon
the general rule of damages in spite of the fact that the special value of
the property necessarily arose from and involved a use of waters from
the river.33
Although there is undoubtedly a logical basis for the theory pro-
pounded by Justice Douglas, there is a basis in justice as well as logic
for the contrary argument expressed by Mr. Justice Burton in the dis-
senting opinion and by Chief Judges Parker and Hutchenson of the
fourth and fifth circuits respectively. This argument is, in essence, that
the dominant interest of the government is limited to the bed of the
stream as defined by the high water mark. The adjacent landowner, it
is true, does not own the water power value in the current of the stream,
but neither does the government have any servitude over the adjacent
fast land. The Supreme Court itself has pointed out that the Federal
Power Act does not abolish private riparian rights vested under state
laws34 and that these rights remain unimpaired until the federal govern-
ment elects to exercise its rights.35 The land is as necessary as the
water for any such development and, until Congress passed the Flood
Control Act of 1944, the necessity and adaptability of the property for the
project would have been a determinative factor as to value in any nego-
tiations between private parties. Thus, when the federal government
takes property which, as here, has been privately combined expressly for
the purpose for which it was taken and is specially adaptable and abso-
lutely necessary for that purpose, this special value must be allowed as
an element of compensation.36 Otherwise the government is extending
its navigation servitude above the high water mark and fastening it upon
the fast land and is violating the constitutional mandate that the com-
pensation be just.
SOLOMON G. CHERRY.
Accord, United States v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co., 339 U. S. 799
(1949) ; -McGovern v. City of New York, 229 U. S. 363 (1913) ; Shoemaker v.
United States, 147 U. S. 282 (1892) ; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403 (1878)
Young v. Harrison, 17 Ga. 30 (1855) ; Alloway v. Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510 (1890)
Sargent v. Inhabitants of Merrimac, 196 Mass. 171, 81 N. E. 970 (1907) ; Gearhart
v. Clear Spring Water Co., 202 Pa. St. 292, 51 Atl. 891 (1902) ; In re Gough &
Asportia, Silloth, and District Water Board, L. R. 1904, 1 K. B. 417.
"' Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Power Corp. 347 U. S. 239 (1954);
cf. Henry Ford and Sons, Inc. v. Little Falls Fiber Co., 280 U. S. 369 (1929),
(Where a licensee of the Federal Power Commission impaired private riparian
rights, the court said that even though these rights are not immune from destruction,
the present legislation does not purport to authorize the Federal Power Commission
to impair such rights, recognized by state law, without just compensation.).
" See note 34 supra. Compare Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,
148 U. S. 312, 330 (1892).
" See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312 (1892).
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